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Abstract. This article examines the psychology of causal attributions concerning the merits of the United 
States Government signing the Kyoto Protocol and of two main operational mechanisms for controlling 
emissions of heat-trapping gases. 
 
Stuart Eizenstat, the United States (US) Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, has stated that the 
US Government's signing of the Kyoto Protocol would likely have the consequences of increasing USG 
negotiating leverage for the many policy Issues remaining to be worked out. However, many 
representatives of the U.S. coal and automobile and their U.S. Congressional supporters maintain that 
the signing will decrease USG leverage. Given that the signing has occurred, the lay scientist might well 
believe that time will tell, as to which opposing side will be right. 
 
But, not so fast. If publicly advocated USG negotiating positions are frequently rejected, signing 
opponents will puff out their chests in the smug satisfaction of being right while signing supporters may 
assert that without the signing an even smaller n umber of negotiation positions would have been 
accepted. If publicly advocated positions are frequently accepted, signing supporters will exhibit the 
chest-puffing, while opponents may claim that the frequency accepted should have been much higher. 
 
The rhetorical devices used to maintain one's initial public stance obfuscate the already complex task of 
attempting to discern cause and effect. This obfuscation is quite useful because the more significant 
source of conflict between the opposing sides has much less to do with the consequences of signing 
than the validity of global warming, the putative relationship between environmental initiative and 
economic health and development, and the attractiveness of internationalism versus nationalism. 
 
Another environmental conflict comprises the relative merits of emissions trading versus clean 
development mechanisms as operational mechanisms for controlling emissions. The former entails a 
country or company achieving credit for emission reductions by buying reductions from another country 
or company that has reduced its emissions more than is required. The latter entails a country or 
company investing in emission-reduction projects in developing countries. In this case, both the investor 
and the recipient of the investment would share credit for the emissions reductions achieved. 
 
The USG and its allies among the developed countries advocate no restrictions on emissions trading 
because such restrictions would attenuate the mechanism's cost-cutting value and attenuate the total 
amount of emissions worldwide. On the other hand, many developing countries term emissions trading 
a means for the USG and its allies to escape any negative economic consequences of environmental 
initiative. Instead, these developing countries prefer clean development mechanisms--even though the 
latter also allows the USG and its allies a similar escape. In fact, many developing countries may well 
prefer clean market mechanisms because such mechanisms allow these countries to escape negative 
economic consequences as well--more than the more moderate escape obtained through emissions 
trading. This last point is reinforced by the observation that--until very recently--virtually all developing 
countries refused to consider lowering their emissions until the developed countries actually attained 
suitable emissions reductions. 
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The bottom line--for protocol signing and for operational mechanisms of emissions reductions--appears 
to be self-interest. If environmental initiative can be crafted to appeal to self-interest, the most resilient 
of ideological, economic, and political concerns may suddenly be viewed as manageable. The hot air of 
political dialogue will then go up in smoke. (See Cushman, J.H., Jr. (November 13, 1998). U.S. signs a pact 
to reduce gases tied to warming. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.co m; Gifford, R., & Hine, 
D.W. (1997). Toward cooperation in commons dilemmas. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 29, 
167-179; Goetze, D. (1994). Comparing prisoner's dilemma, commons dilemma, and public goods 
provision designs in laboratory experiments. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 56-86; Hine, D.W., & 
Gifford, R. (1996). Attributions about self and others in commons dilemmas. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 26, 429-445; Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 24, 183-214; McCusker, C., & Carnevale, P.J. (1995). Framing in resource dilemmas: 
Loss aversion and the moderating effects of sanctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 61, 190-201; Stevens, W.K. (November 14, 1998). Key questions remain at global-warming 
talks. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism, 
Emissions Trading, Environment, Kyoto Protocol.) 
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